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STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
The case in the lower court was in the nature of a judicial 
review of an administratively detennined child support debt in favor of 
:he Defendant/Respondent pursuant to the Public Support of Children Act, 
Chapter 45b, Title 78, Utah Code Annotated (1953) as amended. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The District Court having reviewed the certified record of the 
administrative proceedings and having heard argument by counsel, ordered 
that the Memorandum of Findings and Order previously entered by the 
Administrative Law Judge be affinned. The District Court further ordered 
that the case be remanded for further administrative hearings pursuant 
to the Memorandum of Findings and Order. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff/Appellant seeks reversal of the ruling of the lower 
court, thus barring Defendant from cl aiming any past child support from 
Appellant, and for costs, etc. 
Respondent seeks affirmation of the ruling in the District Court 
below, sustaining the order of the Administrative Law Judge, and thus 
proceeding with a determination of the amount owed to the State by 
~ppel lant. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Appellant, Roseann Catt Karren, and Larry D. Taber were 
married, having three children born of that marriage, to-wit: Michael 
~l len, David, and Kelsey. Pursuant to a Divorce Decree, dated October 
30, 1972, the "care, custody, control and education" of r~ichdel \] ien 
and David were awarded to Mr. Taber and the "care, custody, contr0: and 
education" of Kelsey was awarded to the Appellant. The Divorce DecrPe 
further required Mr. Taber to pay child support of Thirty Doi lars 
($30.00) per week to Appellant for the support of Kelsey. (Plaintiff's 
Exhibit 1 -Transcript of hearing). 
Subsequently, Appellant had both physical and legal custody of 
Kelsey until 1976. However, in an administrative hearing held before the 
Honorable J. Steven Eklund on June 4, 1981, Appellant testified that 
since Mr. Taber had failed to pay child support as set forth in the 
Decree, Appellant relinquished physical custody of Kelsey to Mr. Taber. 
According to Appellant, said transfer of custody would have occurred by 
March of 1976. 
During various months from March, 1976 through March, 1981, ~r. 
Taber received public assistance which included support for the parties' 
three minor children. The amount of such public assistance rece1vPd 
totalled Eleven Thousand Eight Hundred Seventy One and 73/100 OolLirs 
($11,871.73). (Pages 3-5 of Transcript of Proceedinqs - Plaint1f~'s 
Exhibit 3.) 
Pursuant to an assessment conference between ,~ppel I ant and an 
investigator from the Office of Recovery Services, child supp0rt 
arrearages were assessed to be Thirty Five ($35.00) per child per "1011'.'1 
or a total of One Hundred Five Dollars ($105.00) per month. Based on Ulf 
total number of months during which Mr. Taber actually received publ 1c 
assistance, the arrearage sought would be a total of Three Thousanc 
Eight Hundred Eighty Five Dollars ($3,885.00). (Plaintiff's cxh1b1t .1, 
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Pages 5 and 6 of Transcript of Proceedings.) As of this date, Appellant 
has made no payment to the Office of Recovery Services in satisfaction 
of any obligation to provide child support for her three minor children. 
(Page 6 of Transcript of Proceedings.) 
ARGUMENT 
PARENTS HAVE THE PRIMARY DUTY OF SUPPORT FOR THEIR CHILDREN, AND 
TYIS DUTY IS IMPOSED EQUALLY UPON BOTH FATHER AND MOTHER. 
Today, most jurisdictions either by statute or through common 
law, cast upon both parents, according to their ability, the duty of 
supporting their dependent minor children. Both the Utah courts and the 
state legistlature have recognized and articulated the duty of the 
mother as well as the father to support her minor children. In 
State Division of Family Services vs. Clark, 554 PZd 1310 (Utah, 1976), 
the Utah Supreme Court stated in pertinent part: " ... one of the implied 
promises in the marriage contract is to support any children that may 
have been born into the family". In the Court's subsequent discussion of 
the parents' duty of support, the Court continually referred to "their" 
duty of support. 
Furthermore, §78-45-4, Utah Code Anotated (1953) as amended, 
r1>qu1res every woman to support her dependent children. Thus, the 
financial responsibility for the support of children is a joint and 
>everal obligation of both parents. As was stated in Owen vs. Owen, 579 
r2a 911 (Utah, 1978): 
"[U]nder our law both the mother and the father are 
responsible for the support of the children. Therefore, 
even though in the Decree the duty of support was placed 
primarily and mostly upon the Defendant [who was, in that 
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case, the father of the children], the trial court is not 
necessarily obligated to continue that burden entirely 
and exclusively upon him." 
ARGUMENT II 
A DUTY OF SUPPORT CONTINUES IN A DIVORCED MOTHER EVEN WHERE THc 
FATHER HAS LEGAL CUSTODY OF THEIR CHILDREN. 
As was pointed out under Argument I above, most jurisdictions now 
have passed statutes requiring that the wife contribute child support 
along with the husband. In order to avoid conflict with the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, statutes regarding child 
support must be interpreted as requiring the cost of supporting the 
child of divorced parents, in the father's custody, to be apportioned 
between the parents according to their means. (See Carter vs. Carter 397 
NYS2d 88 (N.Y. APP., 1977). 
The fol lowing cases have also recognized that a mother has a duty 
to pay child support for her children who are in the custody of a former 
husband proportionate to her financial ability: Kelley vs. Kelley 378 So 
2d 1069, (1979, La. App.); Hennan vs. Hennan 310 NW 2d 911, (Mich. App, 
1981); Meysenburg vs. Meysenburg 303 NW2d 783, ('leb. 1981); Coble 
vs. Coble 261 SE2d 34, (UC App .• 1979); Straub VS. Tyahla 418 A2d 472, 
(Pa. Super., 1980); and Bradshaw vs. Billips 587 SW2cJ Sl, (Tex Civ. ~pp. 
11th Dist., 1979). 
The Utah Supreme Court is in accord as was evidenced by the•c 
decision in Mccrary vs. Mccrary 599 P2d 1248, (Utah, 1979). In McCrar.r 
(Id.) a father had been awarded custody of the minor children in a 
modification proceeding. He was subsequently injured and reauirerl to 
subsist on disability income. The Court helrJ that the loy;er Court did 
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not abuse its discretion in modifying the original Divorce Decree to 
require that the fonner wife, who was not employed but had a substantial 
bank account, contribute to the suport of the minors who were in the 
father's custody. 
In Beasley vs. Beasley 159 NW2d 449, (Iowa, 1968), the Iowa 
Supreme Court held that a mother had a duty to contribute to the college 
education of her child whose custody had been awarded to the child's 
father. 
In re, Marriage of Muldrow, 132 Cal Rptr 48, (Cal. App., 1976), 
the California Appel late Court held that a trial court abused its 
discretion in a marriage dissolution proceeding by refusing to modify 
the interlocutory decree so as to require the fonner wife to assist the 
husband with the support of their four children who lived with him and 
who were in his custody. In Muldrow the record had established the needs 
of the children and that the father was hard pressed to provide the 
necessary amounts of food, clothing, and other items; whereas the mother 
had the ability to do so. 
ARGllMENT III 
THE ABSENCIO OF A SUPPORT ORDER DOES NOT EXTINGUISH THE SUPPORT 
il8Ll GATI ON OF PARENTS, PARTICULARLY WHERE A TH !RD PARTY SUPPLIES THE! R 
IH~LDREN \•ITH THE NECESSITIES OF LIFE. 
Each parents' statutorily mandated obligation to provide child 
support impliedly becomes a part of every Divorce Decree involving the 
'-iel fare of the children of a marriage. (See Rose vs. Rose, 576 P2d 459 
(Wyoming, 1978). 
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It must be recognized that public assistance has been provided ,, 
the State of Utah for the support of the parties' three children. :o 
Lizotte vs. Lizotte 551 P.2d 137 (Wash. App., 1976), it was stated t•w. 
"Public pol icy dictates that the primary obligation 
for support and care of a child is by those who bring a 
child into the world rather than on the tax payers of 
the state. Therefore, parents have a duty to support 
their children and cannot rid themselves of it by 
transferring the duty to someone else." 
While it is true that the general rule is that the Divorce Oecree 
fixes the obligations of the parties, Stanton vs. Stanton 517 P.2d 1010 
(Utah, 1974), and that where the circumstances would so justify, tne 
trial court may relieve a parent from the obligation to provide C'1il0 
support, Forbush vs. Forbush, 578 P.2d 518, (Utah, 1978), a distinction 
must be drawn between an express order of a District Court that a parent 
is under no obligation to provide support for a cl11ld of the rnarnaqe, 
as compared to the mere silence of a Divorce Decree as to whe>ther .Jny 
child support obligation is imposed on the non-custodial parent. 
The Divorce Decree in the instant case awarded the custody of t•.;o 
of the parties' minor children to Mr. Taber. The Decree further iwar1e1 
the custody of the third child to Appellant and, incident t~errt~. 
ordered Mr. Taber to pay child support. Based on the facts vihich existe·1 
at the time of the entry of the Decree, that Decree is ~nders•dndabl; 
silent as to the amount of any child support obliqation vihich woulj '" 
owed by Appellant. However, events which have occurred subsequent to the 
entry of the Decree (ie., the Plaintiff obtaining physical cus+o1_1 1' 
the third child and subsequently receiving public assistance, "hie· 
included support for all three children) may properly give rise to a 
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possible obligation of the Defendant to reimburse the State of Utah for 
the public assistance which was provided for the support of her 
chl ldren. 
In Barrett vs. Barrett 39 P.2d 621, (Ariz., 1934), the Court 
stated that the provisions in the Divorce Decree awarding the custody of 
the children to the mother and placing the duty of support exclusively 
on her were binding, as between the father and the mother, until, by a 
direct proceeding modified, but they did not extend to the minor 
children; the Court further held that the third person's knowledge of 
tl1e Decree of Divorce and its terms concerning the property rights and 
the custody of the children could not deprive him, if the other facts 
JUSt1fied his giving support to the minors, of the right to maintain the 
action; and that his knowledge, at most, was that the terms of such 
Decree were binding upon the parents and did not in any manner dispense 
with their natural, moral, or legal duties to the children. 
In Stech vs. Holmes 230 NW 326, (Iowa, 1930), the Court held that 
notwithstanding that the parents of a minor child were divorced and the 
custody of the minor child had been given to one of the parents, the 
other parent was liable to a stranger for the reasonable value of 
necessities furnished to the child. 
Utah law is in accord with the above jurisdictions. In Reese vs. 
Mch1bald 311 P.2d 788, (Utah 1957), a suit against the father of a 
child for hospital services rendered to the child, whose custody had 
been awarded to the Defendant's former wife by an Idaho Divorce Decree 
which did not provide for support for the children, the Court, after 
pointing that the great weight of authority is that a father's obliga-
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tion [and likewise a mother's via statutory mandate] tfl support ' 
minor children is not changed by a Divorce Decree vihich 1ives 1•,~ 
custody of the children to the wife [or the father] but ,Jues not menr1,;n 
their support, stated that the law is well settled that a father ,, 
liable [as would be a mother], even in the absence of an expresse~ 
contract, to a third person furnishing necessities to his [her] cn1lJ. 
And more recently, in State Division of Family Services vs. Clark 
554 P.2d 1310, (Utah 1976), the Utah Supreme Court held that the 
absence of any prior adjudications as to the amount(s) fathers shoul~ 
pay for support of their children did not preclude the State Division ut 
Family Services from obtaining judgments against such fathers for tee 
amount of support which it had furnished to such children. 
Thus, the right of the State of Utah reimbursement for the ~,ublic 
assistance which it has prov·1ded in this case is separate and apart fr,,,. 
any alleged right of Mr. Taber to receive child support frori lp1•ellan• 
for the benefit of the minor children in this matter. 
ARGUMENT I 'I 
THE FAILURE OF THE MICHIGAN COURT TO AWARD ANY ORDER OF SUPDQPT 
IS NOT RES JUDICATA TO BAR ROSEANN CATT KARPEN'S LIAB'.L:Tv ~O T"E s·~·. 
FOR REIMBURSEMENT OF P1 18L '.C ASSISTANCE. 
It has long been the law in many J1Jr1siictions that a ·11.~rc 0 
Decree is not res 1udicata concerning an award of support w1 to reqar~ 
third parties who had no notice of the ori•Jinal necree. :n.1ee · 
Parks vs. Parks 272 SW 419, (Ky., 1925), the Kentucky Supreme C8urt ''" 1 ' 
that a Divorce Decree which aave custody to d wife but JHJ ~ot ornv1,1P 
for the support of a minor child was res ~udicata as between tne ~us~and 
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dnd wife, but did not affect the rights of third parties against the 
father. The Court went further to explain that it had not overlooked the 
tact that the judgment was res judicata only to parties and privies; 
however, infant children were neither parties nor privies, nor the 
subJect of barter. 
The Utah Supreme Court has just recently recognized this general 
principle in Knudson vs. Knudson, 660 P.2d 258 (Utah, 1983), the Court 
01odified its prior ruling in Mecham vs. Mecham 570 P.2d 123, (Utah, 
!977) which denied the State reimbursement for funds provided. The Court 
1n Mecham (id.) ruled that where the wife had sought temporary child 
support in the divorce proceeding and the Court's Decree made no 
provision for such support, the matter was res judicata since the 
Department's rights were derived through the wife. However, the Court in 
Knudson (id.) specifically overruled Mecham and provided that where the 
State had no notice of the original proceeding a claim by the State was 
not barred by the doctrine of res judicata. 
The Court in Knudson held that where the Department of Social 
SPrv1ces was not a party to the divorce action, the Divorce Decree was 
not res Judicata to bar the divorced husband's liability to the 
Oepartment for reimbursement of public assistance for child support paid 
to the divorced wife during the pendency of a divorce, notwithstanding 
r~at the Divorce Decree made no mention of temporary alimony, child 
support, or arrearages of either. 
CONCLUSION 
Clearly, Appellant has both a common law and a statutory 
obligation to support her children, which, for the purposes of this 
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proceeding, is neither reduced nor eliminated by whatever may be impl1er1 
from the language of the parties' Divorce Decree. Appellant 1s a 
"responsible parent", within the meaning of §78-45-b-2 Utah Code 
Annotated (1953) as amended, which defines that tenn as "the natural or 
adopive parent of a dependent child". Further, as stated in §78-45b-l.l 
"It is declared to be the public policy of this 
state that this chapter be liberally construed and 
administered that children shall be maintained from the 
resources of responsible parents, thereby relieving or 
avoiding, at least in part, the burden often born by 
the general citizenry through welfare programs." 
For the above stated reasons and pursuant to the authorities 
cited, Respondent respectfully submits this Brief in support of its 
prayer that the ruling in the District Court below be sustained. 
Respectfully submitted this ~/\.v{ day of October, 1983 
TED CANNON 
Salt Lake County Attorney 
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The foregoing Respondent's Brief was mailed to Lynn P. Heward, 
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